Use of Information Technology Systems for Regional Health Care Information-Sharing and Coordination During Large-Scale Medical Surge Events.

Medical surge events require effective coordination between multiple partners. Unfortunately, the information technology (IT) systems currently used for information-sharing by emergency responders and managers in the United States are insufficient to coordinate with health care providers, particularly during large-scale regional incidents. The numerous innovations adopted for the COVID-19 response and continuing advances in IT systems for emergency management and health care information-sharing suggest a more promising future. This article describes: (1) several IT systems and data platforms currently used for information-sharing, operational coordination, patient tracking, and resource-sharing between emergency management and health care providers at the regional level in the US; and (2) barriers and opportunities for using these systems and platforms to improve regional health care information-sharing and coordination during a large-scale medical surge event. The article concludes with a statement about the need for a comprehensive landscape analysis of the component systems in this IT ecosystem.

A Multisite Investigation of Areas for Improvement in COVID-19 Surge Capacity Management.

The congressionally authorized National Disaster Medical System Pilot Program was created in December 2019 to strengthen the medical surge capability, capacity, and interoperability of affiliated healthcare facilities in 5 regions across the United States. The COVID-19 pandemic provided an unprecedented opportunity to learn how participating healthcare facilities handled medical surge events during an active public health emergency. We applied a modified version of the Barbisch and Koenig 4-S framework (staff, stuff, space, systems) to analyze COVID-19 surge management practices implemented by healthcare stakeholders at 5 pilot sites. In total, 32 notable practices were identified to increase surge capacity during the COVID-19 pandemic that have potential applications for other healthcare facilities. We found that systems was the most prevalent domain of surge capacity among the identified practices. Systems and staff were discussed across all 5 pilot sites and were the 2 domains co-occurring most often within each surge management practice. These results can inform strategies for scaling up and optimizing medical surge capability, capacity, and interoperability of healthcare facilities nationwide. This study also specifies areas of surge capacity worthy of strategic focus in the pilot's planning and implementation efforts while more broadly informing the US healthcare system's response to future large-scale, medical surge events.

Validation of Opportunities to Strengthen the National Disaster Medical System: The Military-Civilian NDMS Interoperability Study Quantitative Step.

The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Pilot Program was authorized by Congress to improve the interoperability, capabilities, and capacity of the NDMS. To develop a roadmap for planning and research, the mixed methods Military-Civilian NDMS Interoperability Study (MCNIS) was conducted in 2020-2021. The initial qualitative phase of the study identified critical themes for improvement: (1) coordination, collaboration, and communication; (2) funding and incentives to increase private sector preparedness; (3) staffing capacity and competencies; (4) clinical and support surge capacity; (5) training, education, and exercises between federal and private sector partners; and (6) metrics, benchmarks, and modeling to track NDMS performance. These qualitative findings were subsequently refined, validated, and prioritized through a quantitative survey. Expert respondents ranked 64 statements based on weaknesses and opportunities identified during the qualitative phase. Data were collected using Likert scales, and multivariate proportions and confidence intervals were estimated to compare and prioritize each statement's level of support. Pairwise tests were conducted for each item-to-item pair to determine statistically significant differences. The survey results corroborated the earlier qualitative findings, with all weaknesses and opportunities ranked as important by a majority of respondents. Survey results also pointed to specific priorities for interventions within the 6 previously identified themes. As with the qualitative study, the survey found that the most common weaknesses and opportunities were related to coordination, collaboration, and communication, especially regarding information technology and planning at the federal and regional levels. These priority interventions are now being developed, implemented, and validated at 5 pilot partner sites.

Mass Shootings in America: Consensus Recommendations for Healthcare Response.

BACKGROUND: In 2021, 702 people died in mass shooting incidents (MSIs) in the US. To define the best healthcare response to MSIs, the Uniformed Services University's National Center for Disaster Medicine and Public Health hosted a consensus conference of emergency medical services (EMS) clinicians, emergency medicine (EM) physicians, and surgeons who provided medical response to six of the nation's largest recent mass shootings. STUDY DESIGN: The study consisted of a 3-round modified Delphi process. A planning committee selected 6 MSI sites with the following criteria: the MSI occurred in 2016 or later, and must have resulted in at least 15 people killed and injured. The MSI sites were Orlando, FL, Las Vegas, NV, Sutherland Springs, TX, Parkland, FL, El Paso, TX, and Dayton, OH. Fifteen clinicians participated in the conference. All participants had EMS, EM, or surgery expertise and responded to 1 of the 6 MSIs. The first round consisted of a 2-part survey. The second and third rounds consisted of site-specific presentations followed by specialty-specific discussion groups to generate consensus recommendations. RESULTS: The 3 specialty-specific groups created 8 consensus recommendations in common. These 8 recommendations addressed readiness training, public education, triage, communication, patient tracking, medical records, family reunification, and mental health services for responders. There were an additional 11 recommendations created in common between 2 subgroups, either EMS and EM (2), EM and surgery (7), or EMS and surgery (2). CONCLUSIONS: There are multiple common recommendations identified by EMS, EM, and surgery clinicians who responded to recent MSIs. Clinicians, emergency planners, and others involved in preparing and executing a response to a future mass shooting event may benefit from considering these consensus lessons learned.

Utilization of the TRAIN Learning Network for Online Disaster Medicine and Public Health Training During the COVID-19 Pandemic.

OBJECTIVE: The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic dramatically accelerated a growing trend toward online and asynchronous education and professional training, including in the disaster medicine and public health sector. This study analyzed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the growth of the TRAIN Learning Network (TRAIN) for the year 2020 and evaluated pandemic-related changes in use patterns by disaster and public health professionals. METHODS: The TRAIN database was queried to determine the change in the number of registered users, total courses completed, and courses completed related to COVID-19 during 2020. RESULTS: In 2020, a total of 755,222 new users joined the platform - nearly 3 times the average added annually over the preceding 5 y (2015-2019). TRAIN users completed 3,259,074 training courses in 2020, more than double the average number of training courses that were completed annually from 2015-2019. In addition, 17.8% of all newly added disaster and public health training courses in 2020 were specifically related to COVID-19. CONCLUSION: Online education provided by TRAIN is a critical tool for just-in-time disaster health training following a disaster event or public health emergency, including in a global health crisis such as a pandemic.

Opportunities to Strengthen the National Disaster Medical System: The Military-Civilian NDMS Interoperability Study.

The definitive care component of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) may not be able to effectively manage tens of thousands of casualties resulting from a catastrophic disaster incident or overseas conflict. To address this potential national security threat, Congress authorized the US Secretary of Defense to conduct the NDMS Pilot Program to improve the interoperability, special capabilities, and patient capacity of the NDMS. The pilot's first phase was the Military-Civilian NDMS Interoperability Study, designed to identify broad themes to direct further NDMS research. Researchers conducted a series of facilitated discussions with 49 key NDMS federal and civilian (private sector) stakeholders to identify and assess weaknesses and opportunities for improving the NDMS. After qualitative analysis, 6 critical themes emerged: (1) coordination, collaboration, and communication between federal and private sector NDMS partners; (2) funding and incentives for improved surge capacity and preparedness for NDMS partners; (3) staffing capacity and competencies for government and private NDMS partners; (4) surge capacity, especially at private sector healthcare facilities; (5) training, education, and exercises and knowledge sharing between federal and private sector NDMS partners; and (6) metrics, benchmarks, and modeling for NDMS partners to track their NDMS-related capabilities and performance. These findings provide a roadmap for federal-level changes and additional operations research to strengthen the NDMS definitive care system, particularly in the areas of policy and legislation, operational coordination, and funding.

The National Disaster Medical System and military combat readiness: A scoping review.

ABSTRACT: A scoping review was conducted to describe the history of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) in the context of US military medical preparedness for a large-scale overseas military conflict. National Disaster Medical System civilian hospitals would serve as backups to military treatment facilities if both US Department of Defense and US Department of Veterans Affairs hospitals reached capacity during such a conflict. Systematic searches were used to identify published works discussing the NDMS in the scientific and gray literature. Results were limited to publicly available unclassified English language works from 1978 to January 2022; no other restrictions were placed on the types of published works. Full-text reviews were conducted on identified works (except student papers and dissertations) to determine the extent to which they addressed NDMS definitive care. Data charting was performed on a final set of papers to assess how these works addressed NDMS definitive care. The search identified 54 works published between 1984 and 2022. More than half of the publications were simple descriptions of the NDMS (n = 30 [56%]), and most were published in academic or professional journals (n = 38 [70%]). Only nine constituted original research. There were recurrent criticisms of and recommendations for improving the definitive care component of the NDMS. The lack of published literature on NDMS definitive care supports the assertion that the present-day NDMS may lack the capacity and military-civilian interoperability necessary to manage the casualties resulting from a large-scale overseas military conflict.

Models for Assessing Strategies for Improving Hospital Capacity for Handling Patients during a Pandemic.

OBJECTIVE: The aim of this study was to investigate the performance of key hospital units associated with emergency care of both routine emergency and pandemic (COVID-19) patients under capacity enhancing strategies. METHODS: This investigation was conducted using whole-hospital, resource-constrained, patient-based, stochastic, discrete-event, simulation models of a generic 200-bed urban U.S. tertiary hospital serving routine emergency and COVID-19 patients. Systematically designed numerical experiments were conducted to provide generalizable insights into how hospital functionality may be affected by the care of COVID-19 pandemic patients along specially designated care paths, under changing pandemic situations, from getting ready to turning all of its resources to pandemic care. RESULTS: Several insights are presented. For example, each day of reduction in average ICU length of stay increases intensive care unit patient throughput by up to 24% for high COVID-19 daily patient arrival levels. The potential of 5 specific interventions and 2 critical shifts in care strategies to significantly increase hospital capacity is also described. CONCLUSIONS: These estimates enable hospitals to repurpose space, modify operations, implement crisis standards of care, collaborate with other health care facilities, or request external support, thereby increasing the likelihood that arriving patients will find an open staffed bed when 1 is needed.

Reexamining Health-Care Coalitions in Light of COVID-19.

The national response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has highlighted critical weaknesses in domestic health care and public health emergency preparedness, despite nearly 2 decades of federal funding for multiple programs designed to encourage cross-cutting collaboration in emergency response. Health-care coalitions (HCCs), which are funded through the Hospital Preparedness Program, were first piloted in 2007 and have been continuously funded nationwide since 2012 to support broad collaborations across public health, emergency management, emergency medical services, and the emergency response arms of the health-care system within a geographical area. This commentary provides a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) analysis to summarize the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats related to the current HCC model against the backdrop of COVID-19. We close with concrete recommendations for better leveraging the HCC model for improved health-care system readiness. These include better evaluating the role of HCCs and their members (including the responsibility of the HCC to better communicate and align with other sectors), reconsidering the existing framework for HCC administration, increasing incentives for meaningful community participation in HCC preparedness, and supporting next-generation development of health-care preparedness systems for future pandemics.

An Analysis of After Action Reports From Texas Hurricanes in 2005 and 2017.

OBJECTIVE: To review and analyze After Action Reports from jurisdictions in Texas following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 and Hurricane Harvey in 2017 in order to assess the utility of AARs as a quality improvement measurement tool. METHODS: The authors searched the Homeland Security Digital Library, the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange, and Google Scholar for any AARs that covered the response phase of at least one of the 3 hurricanes, mentioned the state of Texas, and suggested solutions to problems. The authors applied public health emergency management (PHEM) domains, as outlined by Rose et al, to frame the AAR analysis. AARs were coded by 2 reviewers independently, with a third acting as adjudicator. As an example, the problem statements in 2005 and 2017 AARs from 1 statewide agency were compared. RESULTS: Sixteen AARs met the inclusion criteria. There were 500 identified problem-solution sets mapped to a PHEM domain. The content was unevenly distributed, with most issues coming under PHEM 2: Policies, Plans, Procedures, and Partnerships at 45.2% in the 2005 hurricanes and 39.9% in 2017. AARs lacked consistent format and were often prepared by the response agencies themselves. Five consistent issues were raised in 2005 and again in 2017. These were volunteer management and credential verification, donations management, information sharing, appropriately identifying those requiring a medical needs shelter, and inadequate transportation to support evacuation. CONCLUSION: Because of the lack of objective data, inconsistent format, unevenly distributed content, and lack of adherence to any framework, AARs are fraught with shortcomings as a tool for PHEM. Inclusion of more objective reporting measures is urgently needed.

Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that impact disaster health research.

OBJECTIVE: To characterize the strengths and weaknesses of the current status of disaster research evidence; and to identify potential interventions specific to the disciplines of medicine, public health, and social sciences. DESIGN: A mixed method study using nominal group technique and a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis. PARTICIPANTS: Subject matter experts (SMEs) in the fields of medicine, public health, and social sciences who are engaged in disaster research. RESULTS: The nominal group technique achieved 100 percent response rate. After coding and analysis, ten distinct disaster research evidence themes were identified: awareness; evidence quality; funding; human resources; interdisciplinary studies; politics; research process; research topics; sectoral collaboration; and "other." Strengths in each area were limited but focused on quality and workforce pipeline. Weaknesses were limited funding and low research quality. Opportunities included improving methods and increased interdisciplinary collaboration. The threats most consistently identified were limited funding and political influences on disaster research funding. CONCLUSIONS: Disaster research experts from three disciplines identified a number of barriers and facilitators to improving disaster-related research. The limited, inconsistent, and episodic funding and the politics related to it were the greatest and most common barriers. This weakness needs to be strategically addressed to significantly advance the field of disaster research.

Pandemic influenza and major disease outbreak preparedness in US emergency departments: A survey of medical directors and department chairs.

STUDY OBJECTIVES: To quantify the readiness of individual academic emergency departments (EDs) in the United States for an outbreak of pandemic influenza. Methods, design, and setting: Cross-sectional assessment of influenza pandemic preparedness level of EDs in the United States via survey of medical directors and department chairs from the 135 academic emergency medicine departments in the United States. Preparedness assessed using a novel score of 15 critical preparedness indicators. Data analysis consisted of summary statistics, χ2, and ANOVA. PARTICIPANTS: ED medical directors and department chairs. RESULTS: One hundred and thirty academic emergency medicine departments contacted; 66 (50.4 percent) responded. Approximately half (56.0 percent) stated their ED had a written plan for pandemic influenza response. Mean preparedness score was 7.2 (SD = 4.0) out of 15 (48.0 percent); only one program (1.5 percent) achieved a perfect score. Respondents from programs with larger EDs (=30 beds) were more likely to have a higher preparedness score (p < 0.035), an ED pandemic preparedness plan (p = 0.004) and a hospital pandemic preparedness plan (p = 0.007). Respondents from programs with larger EDs were more likely to feel that their ED was prepared for a pandemic or other major disease outbreak (p = 0.01). Only one-third (34.0 percent) felt their ED was prepared for a major disease outbreak, and only 27 percent felt their hospital was prepared to respond to a major disease outbreak. CONCLUSIONS: Significant deficits in preparedness for pandemic influenza and other disease outbreaks exist in US EDs, relative to HHS guidelines, which appear to be related in part to ED size. Further study should be undertaken to determine the barriers to appropriate pandemic preparedness, as well as to develop and validate preparedness metrics.

Pandemic influenza and major disease outbreak preparedness in US emergency departments: A selected survey of emergency health professionals.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the level of pandemic preparedness at emergency departments (EDs) around the country and to better understand current barriers to preparedness in the United States represented by health professionals in the American College of Emergency Physician (ACEP) Disaster Medicine Section (DMS). Methods, design, and setting: A cross-sectional survey of ACEP DMS members was performed. A total of 300 members were surveyed both via e-mail and with paper surveys during the 2009 ACEP Scientific Assembly DMS Meeting. An optional comments section was included for section members' perspectives on barriers to preparedness. A 15-item pandemic preparedness score was calculated for each respondent based on key preparedness indicators as defined by the authors. Results were analyzed with descriptive statistics, χ2 analysis, Cochran-Armitage trend test, and analysis of variance. Free text comments were coded and subjected to frequency-based analysis. RESULTS: A total of 92 DMS members completed the survey with a response rate of 31 percent. Although 85 percent of those surveyed indicated that their hospital had a plan for pandemic influenza response and other infectious disease threats, only 68 percent indicated that their ED had a plan, and 52 percent indicated that their hospital or ED had conducted disaster preparedness drills. Only 57 percent indicated that there was a plan to augment ED staff in the event of a staffing shortage, and 63 percent indicated that there were adequate supplies of personal protective equipment. While 63 percent of respondents indicated that their ED had a plan for distribution of vaccines and antivirals, only 32 percent of EDs had a plan for allocation of ventilators. A total of 42 percent of respondents felt that their ED was prepared in the event of a pandemic influenza or other disease outbreak, and only 35 percent felt that their hospital was prepared. The average pandemic preparedness score among respondents was 8.30 of a total of 15. Larger EDs were more likely to have a higher preparedness score (p = 0.03) and more likely to have a pandemic preparedness plan (p = 0.037). Some major barriers to preparedness cited by section members included lack of local administration support, challenges in funding, need for dedicated disaster preparedness personnel, staffing shortages, and a lack of communication among disaster response agencies, particularly at the federal level. CONCLUSIONS: There appear to be significant gaps in pandemic influenza and other infectious disease outbreak planning among the hospitals where ACEP DMS members work. This may reflect a broader underlying inadequacy of preparedness measures.

A Comparison of US Federal Government Spending for Research and Development Related to Public Health Preparedness Capabilities, 2008-2017.

OBJECTIVE: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention developed 15 National Public Health Emergency and Preparedness Response Capabilities (NPHPRCs) to serve as national standards for health-related core capabilities. The objective of this study is to determine the level of federal funding allocated for research related to NPHPRCs during 2008-2017. METHODS: An online search of http://www.USAspending.gov was performed to identify federal awards, grants, contracts from 2008-2017 related to research associated with NPHPRCs. Inclusion criteria were identifiable as research and disaster-related; US-based; and specific reference to any of the NPHPRCs. A panel of 3 experts reviewed each entry for inclusion. RESULTS: The search identified 15 278 transactions representing US $29.2 billion in awards. After exclusions, 93 entries were found to be related to NPHPRCs, averaging US $2 783 136 annually. Funding notably dropped to US $168 684 in 2010 and ceased entirely in 2016. Ten (67%) of NPHPRCs received funding. Eighty-percent of funding focused on 4 capabilities. Three federal agencies funded 80% of research. Sixteen (24%) of the 47 recipients received 80% of all funding. CONCLUSION: US federal investments in research and development related to NPHPRCs have been highly variable over the past decade. One-third of NPHPRCs receive no funding. There are notable gaps in funding, content, continuity, and scope of participation.